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Abstract
Disengagement from radical social groups is a complex process initiated by the experience of a crisis, or
disillusionment causing a re-evaluation of involvement. This paper provides a review of the experiences that hinder
group involvement and increases the likelihood of disengagement. Utilising the categorisation by Klandersman
(2005) and Demant et al. (2008a), the factors are discussed under the themes of normative, affective, and
continuance. Normative factors rely on the ideological premise to ensure membership is viewed as a moral
obligation, while the affective factors incorporate the social and organisational aspects facilitating emotional
attachment to the group, and continuance factors are those influencing the cost and benefits of group involvement.
Commitment to radical social groups becomes vulnerable when the material, psychological and communal benefits
of membership are outweighed by the resources required for association and the inability to achieve desirable
outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION
Research on the defection from religious groups, cults, gangs and criminal organisations indicate similar contributing
factors to disengagement despite differing ideologies (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Fink & Hearne, 2008). The
operational definition of disengagement within this paper is characterised by Fink and Hearne (2008), and Bjørgo
and Horgan (2009) as a behavioural change resulting in the exit from a radical social group (characterised as secular
and cohesiveness, ethnocentric, totalitarian and with a propensity for violence), notwithstanding any cognitive shifts,
or deradicalisation. Models of disengagement by Skonovd (1979, April) and Ebaugh (1988) emphasise how members
experience a crisis or disillusionment causing doubts to arise and the re-evaluation of membership (Fink & Hearne,
2008; Mellis, 2007; Mushtaq, 2009; Wright, 1987). This cognitive opening begins the psychological process for
possible disengagement by allowing alternative viewpoints and lifestyles to be considered. As a break down in the
insulation from the outside world occurs, disengagement can be accelerated when combined with social and
economic support, education and counselling. As the initiating stage of the process, it is imperative to the study of
disengagement to identify the reasons for disillusionment caused by the incongruence between the individual’s
expectations and the reality of membership, whereby the discrepancies between the two do not align forcing
membership to be viewed as less meaningful (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Dechesne, Janssen, & Van Knippenberg,
2000; Demant, Slootman, Buijs, & Tillie, 2008b). For some, the disillusionment gradually builds until the desire to
disengage exists, for others, there can be a singular catalytic event prompting a more abrupt psychological
disengagement. The aim of this paper is to identify and review the contributing factors towards disillusionment with
radical social groups in the literature.

CATEGORISING THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OF DISENGAGEMENT
The process of disengagement is inherently complex and multi-layered, influenced by an amalgamation of issues and
personal factors compounding on the individual. Bjørgo (2002, June; 2005, 2009) discusses the causes of
disengagement in terms of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors; that is, negative social forces which make membership
unattractive, and factors attracting the person to a more rewarding alternative. The effects of push factors can be
difficult to predict as negative sanctions can lead members to disengage or have the converse effect by increasing the
group’s solidarity and cohesiveness (Bjørgo, 2005). Demant et al. (2009) noted influences causing individuals to
defect involved complex psychological processes rarely operating in isolation, allowing both push and pull factors to
co-exist, and the difficulties in effectively measuring each factor. Building on Bjørgo’s foundation, Klandermans
(2005) and Demant et al. (2008a, 2008b) compartmentalise individual disengagement factors into three components
– normative, affective, and continuance ( see Table 1.). These categorisations coincide with previous literature (Allen
& Meyer, 1990) focusing on the psychological states of organisational commitment where all categories are
influential in the decision to disengage, and its ensuing success. In short, strong affective commitment allows
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members to stay because they want to, strong continuance commitment encourages members to stay because they
need to, and strong normative commitment causes members to stay because they feel they ought to (Allen & Meyer,
1990).
Table 1
Normative, Affective and Continuance Factors Contributing to Disengagement
Normative:
Ideology is no longer
appealing
Change in individual’s
viewpoint
Desired future is not
achievable
Rejection of means to
achieve goals

Affective:
Disappointment in movement

Continuance:
Cost of membership

Frustration with group
dynamics
Disloyalty between members

Longing for ordinary life

Mutual competition,
contempt and distrust
between members
Failing leadership

Competing social
relationships

Negative social sanctions

NORMATIVE
The normative factors rely on the ideological premise of the group to maintain commitment and ensure membership
is viewed as a moral obligation (Allen & Meyer, 1990; Klandermans, 1997). The ideology provides a constructed
model of beliefs, aims and ideas to direct one’s goals, expectations and actions. It offers a set of ideals, principles or
symbols to explain how society should function, and for distinct radical social groups, combines a collectively
defined grievance, with a clear definition of those responsible – producing an ‘us against them’ mentality and
fostering moral outrage (Klandermans, 1997). As an alternative ideology, the adopted beliefs can instigate collective
action for the intent to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing power system to uphold ideological values
(Dechesne et al., 2000; Demant et al., 2008a).
The alignment between individual and group ideologies is positively correlated with normative attachment, and
corresponding disengagement is an indication of failings in the group’s ideology that makes membership and worldview unattractive (Demant et al., 2008b). When no longer provided with a satisfying world-view, meaning to the
existing order, a desirable future or a means to achieve this future, the member has an increased susceptibility to
alternative options (Demant et al., 2008a). While the changes to the individual’s perception and acceptance of the
group’s ideological basis can lead to the rejection of radical views, it is more common for the changes in belief and
value systems to occur after disengaging from the group (Horgan, 2005).

Lose faith in ideology
The experience of self-doubt in aspects of the ideology can motivate the individual to view one’s beliefs, and what
the group is fighting for, as morally or politically wrong (Horgan, 2005). A failure to provide meaning or response
to the member’s concerns causes further doubts in the relevance of the group, as can the perceived lack of success in
achieving the ideologically stated goals. When the individual’s needs and motives no longer coincide with what the
ideology is able to provide, the individual is more likely to disengage and deradicalise, or seek out an alternative
group more suited to the individual’s needs (Demant et al., 2008b). A study of three separate radical movements by
Demant et al. (2008a) unveiled causes for the loss of faith in group ideologies; the changes in interpretation by the
consensus, inconsistencies between aims and ideals between members, and the inability to implement a politically
acceptable ideology that is radical enough for extreme members. As the movement evolves into a political influence,
the radical ideological beliefs previously imposed on members may be compromised to appeal to a greater audience
and gain greater community support. As a consequence, the member may find the ideological impetus for radical acts
no longer exists, or may view the group as ‘selling out’ and seek an alternative radical group to engage with
(Noricks, 2009).
Rommelspacher (2006) argues interactions that disrupt the group’s world-view, and provide alternative explanations
perceived as justifiable, can have a significant influence on the member’s disengagement process. This cognitive
disruption can also be caused by interactions with others who do not comply with the ideology or conform to existing
stereotypes. The result of the inconsistencies between ideology and personal experience can alter the view of society
(or the segment of the community) as the enemy. For example, Johnny Clarry, the ex-Grand Imperial Wizard of the
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Ku Klux Klan refers to the meetings with African-American Reverend Wade Watts, where his expectations of the
‘enemy’ were shattered, “and then when Reverend Wade Watts was being kind to me - and he outsmarted me in that
debate, I started realising that maybe not all white people were superior to black people” (Denton & Jacoby, 2005,
Septemper 5). Despite attempts to demonise Watts, Clarry notes the conflict in his expectations and experiences
acted as a trigger to questioning his beliefs. This was also supported by Garfinkel’s (2007) study where ethnocentric
beliefs were challenged by compassion from the despised out-group, conflicting with their endorsed stereotypes.
Although, as conveyed by Garfinkel (2007), this disruption only occurs if the recipient has the humility and courage
to accept previously held beliefs may be flawed.
The self doubt in the group’s ideology can lead to questioning the validity of the group and if it is unable to address
these concerns through dialogue or attempts to address the grievance, the member is at risk of disengaging. However,
while normative factors may be perceived as deficient, interactions can be maintained due to affective and
continuance factors, as discovered by Photiadis’ (1965) study of Mormon commitment and conformity. Participation
on a social level provided greater influence on commitment and conformity to group norms, independent of
ideological differences. Thus, despite doubts in the ideological basis for the group, disengagement can be
significantly inhibited by social and lifestyle benefits of commitment.

Frustration at lack of success
Socialisation into radical groups requires a high level of commitment and enforces a collective identity where group
ideology and goals are fused with the individual’s identity (Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003). As a consequence, the
inability to distinguish between goals means success or failure is taken personally with emotional reactions of shame
and guilt. Failed radical attempts at altering the status quo, and the realisation that despite the personal sacrifice of
group commitment and acting in the most extreme, the desired goal is no closer, produces a demotivating effect and
uncertainty regarding the group’s radical actions (Demant et al., 2008a; Fink & Hearne, 2008). Failure at achieving
ideological success generates a diminished sense of urgency and the realisation that initial aspirations associated with
membership are removed from day-to-day responsibilities of the adopted role. When the individual determines their
investment has been quite substantial, yet the goal remains a distant realisation, the probability of defection is
heightened (Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Horgan, 2005; Wright, 1987).
The effects of failure have been measured in mainstream contexts with Snyder, Lassegard and Ford’s (1986) study of
successful and unsuccessful university groups. Participants led to believe they had failed a task displayed less interest
in participating in future group activities and were less inclined to self-identify with the group, while the opposite
effect occurred for successful groups. The social distance between the individual and group failure serves as a
strategy to avoid negative evaluation and protects self-esteem. However, De Cremer and van Dijk’s (2002) found
when negative feedback on group performance was provided, only those with salient personal identities (as opposed
to salient collective identities) would reduce contribution to the group, proposing group failure is only precursor to
disengagement for individuals without a salient group identity. When distancing is observed by core members, the
attempts to restore the self identity at the expense of the collective is viewed as a lack of commitment and disloyalty
(Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). At this point, members with salient personal identities, and behave
with greater self-interest, are more likely to be rejected and/or expelled by group members with greater salient
collective identities (Branscombe et al., 1999).

Rejection of violence
Arguably, the most common reason for leaving radical social groups is the personal or indirect experiences of
violence due to extremist ideologies and hatred (Fink & Hearne, 2008; Horgan, 2005; Noricks, 2009). The
underlying reasons for rejecting violence can be of an ideological, strategic or organisational nature (Demant et al.,
2008a). The ideological rejection of violence includes the individual’s attitudes and morals surrounding violence,
such as violence is inherently bad or creates undesired animosity. Strategically, violence is no longer seen as a
successful method to achieving desired outcomes, and finally, the influence of violence on the organisation, such as
in-group violence causing fragmentation within the movement. These violent stresses can lead to the rejection of
violence and the rejection of the social group, causing disillusionment and an increase propensity for disengagement.
While disengaging does not determine the violent behaviours of the individual, the rejection of violent means to
achieve ideological aims is considered part of the deradicalisation process.
Husain (2007) details the horror experienced with the death of an innocent life and the realisation of the violent
situation he had helped create. The halaqah endorsed the belief the life of a kafir is inconsequential in accomplishing
Muslim dominance and Husain experienced anxiety over the method of violence. Rommelspacher’s (2006; as cited
in Demant et al., 2008a) study into German right-wing extremists found confrontation with violence caused some of
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the movement’s members to rethink involvement because of the view ‘it was taken too far’. Supporting the
experience of violence as a precipitating factor to disengagement includes the analysis of the Moluccan and
squatter’s movements (Demant et al., 2008a), and gangs in America (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996), whereby the
personal confrontation with violence contributed considerably to the decline of group membership. Decker and Van
Winkle’s (1996) interviews with ex-members from St Louis’ street gangs found experiences of violence, directly or
indirectly, to be a consistent reason for disengagement, with the period immediately after the violent confrontation
being the most susceptible for cognitive shifts. However, intervention must be swift to prevent the solidarity imposed
by the gang’s interpretation of the violence as favourable.

AFFECTIVE
The affective factors are the social and organisational aspects facilitating or impeding emotional attachment to the
group, and are central to an individual’s propensity to maintain affiliations even when ideological differences are
present. This affective attachment incorporates psychological investment to the group, emotional attachment to the
group’s goals and values, as well as the individual’s role (Allen & Meyer, 1990). Feeling competent and comfortable
in a role within the group is arguably the strongest antecedent to emotional attachment.
A positive correlation exists between affective attachment to the collective and the identification and involvement,
and conversely, disappointment with intra-group interactions can weaken commitment and willingness to participate
(Demant et al., 2008a; Klandermans, 1997). The failure in organisational capacity results in the group’s inability to
fulfil social and cultural functions or utilise sufficient new sources (Demant et al., 2008a). Affective commitment is
subjected to dual processes; whereby reduction influences the member’s perspective and highlights perceived
deficiencies in normative and continuance spheres, or the reduction may be a consequence of an existing deficit.

Failing group interaction
Radical social groups adopt various organisational structures; from fixed, hierarchal organisations with authoritarian
leaders, to fluid and decentralised networks, yet all are susceptible to negative organisational factors which influence
both maintenance and disengagement with intra-group relationships. Whether formally recognised or not, each
member is assigned status where leaders are viewed as ‘exemplary’, and ethically and morally consistent with the
group’s ideals and goals, and group members who do not uphold the prototypical characteristics are viewed as less
worthy, causing internal conflict (Demant et al., 2008a). Internal conflicts such as power plays, competition between
members and disloyalty can dishearten members, and rejection or receiving negative feedback from the collective
can cause personal uncertainty regarding acceptance (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Branscombe et al., 1999; Demant et
al., 2008a; Horgan, 2005). The antagonism within members can produce paranoia and, in terms of radical groups,
fears of infiltration from rival groups or authorities. The mutual competition, contempt and distrust can cause
disillusionment as the individual does not achieve the level of security expected when joining (Bjørgo & Horgan,
2009).
Rejection from the group can be perceived as a threat of expulsion, the removal of membership status, or the
unwillingness of the group to accept the individual as a prototypical member of the group (Branscombe et al., 1999).
The strength of identification with the group will determine the individual’s reaction. Members low in identification
may disidentify in anticipation of further rejection, maintaining self-esteem by attaching a positive emotional
response to their non-prototypical identity and applying a self-categorisation into a group interpreted as a ‘better
match’. Those high in identification are more likely to experience low self-esteem as they continue to admire
prototypical members and view themselves unfavourably (Branscombe et al., 1999). The interpretation of rejection
from the social group renders disengagement and intervention more practical for members with low identification.

Failing leadership
Jacob’s (1987) interviews with voluntary religious defectors emphasised four sources for disillusionment with the
leader; physical abuse, psychological abuse, emotional rejection, and spiritual betrayal. The study indicated
psychological abuse and emotional rejection were the predominant causes of disillusionment, with rejection derived
from unfilled expectations of the spiritual god or the affective relationship between leader and follower. The spiritual
betrayal is linked to the leader not fulfilling expectations of a moral and pious lifestyle. As leaders are representative
of the prototypical member or presented as the ‘hero’ for members to admire, inconsistencies between leaders and
group ideals, or the message propagated can lead to the interpretation of the ideology and methods to achieve goals
as insincere (Demant et al., 2008a; Rommelspacher, 2006; Wright, 1987). The double standards in lifestyle
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regulations between leaders and members can lead to resentment and cause doubts in the sacrifices required to
achieve group goals (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009).
Members can also become disillusioned by the inability of leaders to provide sufficient direction and focus, or adapt
to changing circumstances and inspire members (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Demant et al., 2008a; Fink & Hearne,
2008). A lack of leadership and political influence structurally can cause member’s to doubt the group’s capability to
achieve societal change (Demant et al., 2008a). While this may be a reason for departing the social group, it can also
cause members to seek out another, more radical, social group.

CONTINUANCE
Continuance commitment is the awareness of consequences and personal costs associated with leaving, and are
linked to the practical life circumstances making membership attractive or unattractive (Allen & Meyer, 1990;
Klandermans, 1997). Two factors influence the strength of continuance commitment: the degree of investment to the
role and group, and the perceived lack of viable alternatives. The individual interprets a profit associated with
maintaining participation, and a cost associated with leaving, thus, any changes to the social identity are viewed with
the knowledge of negative consequences and penalties (Becker, 1960; Demant, Wagenaar, & van Donselaar, 2009;
Klandermans, 1997). Demant et al. (2008a) proposes continuance factors only play a supporting role, providing
extra motivation to the normative and affective factors of disengagement. Only when practical life circumstances
become prominent and provide a negative variant, such as outside pressure and stigmatisation, does it have a direct
role in disengagement.

Maturation
Some radical social groups tend to consist of young participants and furthermore, Weinberg (2008) argues the longer
the organisation exists, the younger the recruits become. In comparison to the founding generation, Weinberg (2008)
suggests youthful members are less ideologically or religiously sophisticated, lack an understanding of the long term
purposes of the organisation, and are typically ‘looking for action’. While street gangs and racist groups can reflect
this analysis, Weinberg’s (2008) argument conflicts with Sageman (2004, 2005) and Horgan’s (2008) study of
terrorism with the average age of Jihadis to be 26, and 25 for al-Qaeda – well past adolescence. The opposite is also
true for one percent motorcycle clubs as Veno (2003) asserts the average age in the 1980’s was approximately 25
years old, but demographic changes has seen the average age rise to the late 30’s.
Despite older cohorts, the effects of aging within a radical lifestyle are still influential in the practicality of group
involvement. Veno (2003) notes as members of the one percent motorcycle clubs age, participating in group
activities becomes increasingly difficult; for example the inability to handle the cultural symbol Harley-Davidsons,
opting for trikes or cars, or the inability to endorse ‘hard living’ lifestyle of alcohol and partying. The isolation of the
groups from institutions can result in members avoiding medical treatment, and in the case of one percent motorcycle
clubs, years of harmful lifestyle choices can lead to medical conditions preventing further involvement in group
events and celebrations (Veno, 2003).
In consideration of youthful recruits, there are many advantageous – and disadvantages – to drawing on this
demographic. An advantage is their ability to devote themselves in terms of time and resources to the movement due
to the lack of restraints from familial or employment responsibilities (Demant et al., 2008a; Silke, 2003). There is
also the idealistic notion of having the ability to change the world and possess the energy to pursue group tasks
(Gendron, 2006). However, the problem faced by the group is maintaining this level of dedication as the youth
develop into more adult roles and identities. The importance of membership wanes as they no longer have the same
need for excitement, have less energy or crave a more subdued lifestyle (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Demant et al.,
2008a; Horgan, 2005). Not only is the maturation of an individual member influential on the group, but members
typically outgrow the movement and leave as an aggregate. For the group to exist after the members disengage, it
needs to recruit and replace with a younger cohort, posing more concerns regarding the attractiveness to a younger
generation.

Competing social relationships
The realisation that further radicalisation will require the permanent severance of interpersonal connections can
frighten members from furthering their involvement, particularly those with previous connections to society (Demant
et al., 2008a). However, those from minority groups are expected to experience a different process as the connection
to society is not felt as strongly as those from the majority (Demant et al., 2008a). It is more likely the lack of
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connection contributed to the first step in the radicalisation process for minorities, while it acts as the final barrier to
radicalisation for the majority. These social groups meet members’ social and affective needs, and in some cases can
serve in place of primary or quasi-primary groups; for example, as a surrogate family (Wright, 1987). However,
when disillusioned with the group, external relationships increase in influence and place strain on the resources the
individual commits to the group. When associated with external people the radical trusts and respects, the interaction
can operate in opposition to the group and intervention can be initiated through ideological dialogue (Demant et al.,
2008a). The respect for these individuals increases the openness to alternative opinions and world-views and
encourages doubts and questioning of the group’s ideology (Demant et al., 2008a).
Social groups are aware of the strain dyadic relationships can place on members’ time and resources, and frequently
there are formal and informal regulations restricting two-person intimacy, or the world-view endorses attitudes to
counter the dyadic formation. For example, encouraging celibacy or sexual pluralism, or the attitude of the opposite
sex as inferior and a threat to group stability (Wright, 1987). Failure to do so can threaten membership in various
ways, such as one member of the dyad wants to leave and persuades the other, or as the relationship intensifies
greater emotional investments is placed in the dyadic relationship at the expense of other existing relationships.
Increased interaction with non-members can cause normative ambiguity due to the lack of reciprocity over shared
beliefs and the affirming of peaceful behaviours (Garfinkel, 2007). Family and partners are a source of support and
provide a sounding board for concerns and emphasise the plausibility of alternative and socially acceptable options
(Fink & Hearne, 2008). The establishment of a family external to the group also places demands on member to adopt
new responsibilities for both the spouse and children, Horgan and Bjørgo (2009) argue this is one of the strongest
motivations for the defection from radical social groups.
The reduction of insulation from the outside world can have negative implications for group relationships acting as
vehicles of meaning and values. By disrupting the meaningful interactions between a member and the group, the
dependent socialisation and commitment processes are interrupted (Wright, 1987). This provides a stimulus for
altering discredited perceptions of the larger society by removing group boundaries; therefore, minimising group
distinctions and undermining the importance of belonging to a unique social group. While it is proposed members
will seek affirming reactions from external social relationships when group relations no longer fulfil affective needs,
contextual factors of memberships need to be acknowledged, particularly, the argument of only members who join
the social group to fulfil social requirements are likely to drift to external relations if their needs are not met, and in
contrast, movements successful in meeting members affective requirements will cause members to leave for reasons
independent to unfulfilled affective needs (Wright, 1987).

External pressures and stigmatisation
Involvement with radical social groups and associated activities can cause emotional strain and be detrimental to
relationships and future opportunities. Those operating in a clandestine manner and experiencing threats of violence
or punitive actions by enemies or authorities can find themselves longing for a ‘normal’ life; including lifestyle
factors unavailable while maintaining membership, such as marriage and beginning a family, and/or developing a
career, or living without fear (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Fink & Hearne, 2008; Horgan, 2005). While some members
perceive the notion of a normal way-of-life to be dull, the experiences of stigmatisation, social isolation and the
consumption by intense hatred can exhaust the individual leading to a break down or exhaustion.
A radical social identity can produce negative repercussions in other social contexts and influence the perception and
treatment from others outside the radical milieu. The individual identity that exists externally can be disregarded in
social situations where the expectation is to be assessed on individual characteristics or merits; such as employment
interviews (Branscombe et al., 1999). The stigmatisation may produce feelings of discrimination and disappointment
when the individual deems their radical identity as irrelevant or illegitimate to the context. The lack of opportunities
due to negative relationships with the community can increase dependency on the organisation, or may cause the
evaluation of the costs associated with maintaining the radical identity. For those encountering low identification
with their social group, this discrimination can emphasise intergroup heterogeneity and/or further disillusionment
with their membership (Branscombe et al., 1999).

BARRIERS TO DISENGAGEMENT
The decision to leave the radical collective behind is as significant and complex as joining with several factors
impeding the process. Devoting significant amounts of time and resources to the collective can result in the
perception of withdrawal as a personal failure. Taylor (1988, p. 168) refers to this as the concept ‘spiralling of
commitment’ in radical groups, where previous investments and organisational pressures entrap the individual into
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remaining despite doubts. The barriers enforcing group commitment consist of three fundamental elements; (1)
ensuring the member’s behaviour requires socio-psychological investments, (2) decisions reinforcing this investment
are advocated as the only feasible option, and (3) any efforts to avoid the investment only serve to consolidate the
entrapment of the member (Taylor, 1988). These barriers are designed to ensure the dominance of the radical
ideology, the individual’s social dependence on the group and instil practical lifestyle barriers that make withdrawal
unattractive. Demant et al. (2008a) identifies examples of barriers in radical groups as the costs involved in
disengaging, fear of reprisals from the group, the loss of reputation and protection, and the marginal position
following disengagement. Disengaging from any social group can have negative repercussions in terms of the loss of
identity and community; however, the radical groups can produce additional and more severe consequences that need
to be considered by the individual.

SUMMARY
Social groups are a significant component in human interaction and the investment of time and resources, as well as
the emotional attachment, make departing a painful experience. The nature of radical social groups ensures members
are socially and psychologically invested and utilise socialisation practices to prevent withdrawal. As a consequence,
disengaging can have negative repercussions for the self-identity and well-being of the ex-member. The
aforementioned contributing factors to disillusionment in themselves may not be valid, solitary reasons for
disengaging; however, produce significant rationalising effects on the initial phase of doubt and help to overcome
socialisation barriers. Commitment is likely to wane when material, psychological and communal benefits of
membership are outweighed by the resources required for association and the inability to achieve desirable outcomes.
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